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Purpose 
 
During the past  four years the word “ economic crisis” has become sadly famous. 
All around the world economists, politicians, state secretaries and university professors tried to 
give concrete advices in order to restore economic growth. 
As  a  young  engineering  student,  who  doesn’t  have  the  knowledge  of  a  professor,  the 
competence of an economist or the skills of a politician, I would like to give my modest but 
passionate help by describing what, in my opinion, could help us building a better tomorrow, 
not only for us but for the future generations as well. 
I think that the main way to change in better the unpleasant situation we are living is not only 
improving our technologic an scientific knowledge, but also creating more jobs. 
To create new jobs and boost the innovation we need the birth of new kind of enterprises, 
we need to bring them in the global market and make them grow. 
Obviously this is a very difficult quest, especially nowadays, but I personally saw in Game 
Theory one of the more useful lines that a young enterpreneur can follow to realize his 
ideas. 
This is the reason that brings me to give in this thesis a description of this foudamental and 
,in some ways, “different” mathematic theory and focus on the useful market applications 
that a hi-tech start-up founder can use in order to build a successful business which could 
create jobs and economic prosperity to the society. 
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 ﾠ
1  Game theory 
 
1.1   What is this? 
 
First of all let’s define what a game is. We consider a game a theoretical description of 
conflicts of interest. To be more clear, think about a political controversy between two 
countries, a business confict between two corporations in a specific sector, a football player 
shooting a penalty, a husband arguing with his wife about who should wash the dishes. 
These are few examples of what we can consider a game. 
It is easy to see how wise is the range of this definition since we play several games during  
everyday life. But how can we mathematically describe such situations? 
First of all we must consider all the decisions that could be made by players and their 
consequences. Based on the consequences we give to each player a payoff and then we 
analize the game. This explanation is rough and simple but we will deepen it later. 
It is useful to describe all the possible forms a game can assume. 
•  COOPERATIVE GAMES 
In these games there are coalitions of players, and  we specife only the payoff of 
each potential group although we can’t say anything on how and why these groups 
decided to cooperate. A practical example could be the parliament or the senate 
during the discussion and the vote of a law. 
•  NONCOOPERATIVE GAMES 
Noncooperative games is concerned with the analysis of strategic conflicts where 
players act in their own interest only. This assuption does not exclude the possibility 
of a coalition, but this coalition’s purpose is to maximise each own payoff. 
•  EXTENSIVE GAMES 
We will call extensive games that kind of games where there is no temporal content. 
Every  decision  is  made  simoultaneously  without  knowing  the  choices  of  other 
players. 
•  NONEXTENSIVE GAMES 
Nonextensive games, in opposition to the previous definition, consider the temporal 
content and players can be over time informed about the actions of others. 
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1.2   Terminology 
 
We should give now a sort of glossary for the most common and important words used 
throughout this work. 
 
•  Common knowledge 
 
            We define as common knowledge a fact that is noticed by all players, and e          
 
 
•  Dominating strategy 
 
We say that a strategy is dominating over an other strategy when it always gives a 
better payoff to the considered player regardless the actions of other players. 
 
•  Extensive game 
 
A game graphically described with a tree is called an extensive game. 
 
•  Payoff 
 
A payoff is a number that reflects the benefit of an outcome to a player. 
 
•  Perfect information 
 
We talk about perfect information when a player knows every move that has been 
made until then. 
  
•  Rationality of players 
This is a foundamental assumption. We say that the players are rational when they 
always play the strategy which maximises their own payoff. 
 
•  Strategy 
 
We call strategy an element of the set of all possible actions. 
 
•  Mixed Strategy 
 
A  strategy  is  called  mixed  when  a  player  considers  probability  in  the  decision-
making process. 
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2   Dominating strategies 
 
2.1   Dominance 
 
We make the assumption that all players are rational. A rational player makes a choice that 
gives him the payoff he prefers most, considering what his opponents do. 
In a limit case the player has two strategies, A and B, and he finds out that, regardless the 
combination of choices of other players, the outcome of A is always better than the one 
resulting from B. Then strategy A is said to be a dominant strategy over B. 
Since every player is rational, nobody will choose to play a dominated strategy. 
The following examples illustrate more clearly this ideas, 
 
•  Corporations in a competitive market 
 
Suppose  we  have  two  technology  corporations,  HR  inc.  and  PINEAPPLE 
computers inc. (PA). These corporations must decide the volume of production of 
smartphones for the next year in order to take over the market and gain more profits. 
For now we assume that they are not forced to take their decision simultaneously 
and that both of them have perfect information on the decisions that have been 
made.  
 
 
Figure 1.1: Tree representation of the game.  
Payoffs	


(HR,Pineapple)	


	


Pineapple	


decisions	


	


HR 
decisions	


HR	


Max 
Production	


Max 
Production	

 (400,400)	


Min 
Production	

 (600, 100)	


Min 
Production	


Max 
production	

 (100, 600)	


Min 
Producion	

 (300, 300)	
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The graphic tree representation above gives a more clear view of the game.  
HR has the first move and must decide before Pinapple the volume of production of 
the product. If HR chooses to produce smartphones at the maximum capacity of its 
facilities, in response Pineapple can  decide to produce at the top of its resources or 
at the minimum. If Pineapple chooses the first option they will gain a profit of 400 
millions $ both, while, if the second option is preferred, HR will recieve profits for 
600 millions $ and Pineapple only for 100 millions $. But these decisions are simple 
actions, they are not strategies. We define strategy a set of decions that a player (in 
this  case  the  two  corporations)  can  take  in  contrast  to  the  situations  which  can 
develop during the game. In the tree described above, a strategy put in display what 
the player will do for every decisional node of the tree. When, like in this case, the 
decisions of the playes are not at the same time, we can define a decision rule 
which  specify  what  decision  the  player  who  moves  for  second  should  take  in 
response to other players choices. For example a decision rule for Pineapple could 
be: “ if HR opts for the max production, we will opt for max production too”. 
We conclude this paragraph showing another useful way to represent graphically a 
game, the so called matrix representation. 
                                                    
1 
 
          
This matrix, which is very simple in this case, shows clearly the various options and their 
payoff for every player and can be used in a large variety of games. But while the tree 
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 ﾠUsually the names of the players are written in the first cell of the table, while in the other 
cells of the first column and row are written, respectively, the options of the first and of the 
second player. In the other cells usually are reported the payoffs of the player, higlighted with 
a different color in this case. 
 
HR     
Max Production 
 
Min production 
Pineapple 
 
 
Max production 
                        400            
 
400 
                       100 
 
600  
 
 
Min production 
                        600 
 
100 
                   300 
 
300 	
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representation gives us the possibility to describe decisions taken in different times, the 
matrix drawed above suits more for cuncurrent selections of the action to play. That is the 
reason why we will use the table representation for extensive games while we will prefer 
the tree representation for nonextensive games. 
After having introduced in a general way the notion of dominance, we give some formal 
mathematic definitions. We will always refer to vectors by writing them in bold letters. 
 
Definition: Payoff 
For an N-person game we say that the function ei(x1, x2,…, xi,…, xN) is the payoff  to 
player i if players 1, 2, 3,…i-1, i, i+1,.., N play the strategies x1, x2,…xi-1, xi, xi+1,…, xN. 
 
Definition: Dominance 
For a two person game we say that a couple of solutions (x2, y2) dominates (x1,, y1) if e1(x2, 
y2) ≥ e1(x1, y1)  with strict inequality in at least one case. If a game is between more than two 
players we can extend the above definition using vectors of solutions (x1, y1, a1, b1,….., z1). 
 
Definition: Pareto Optimality 
A pair of strategies (x, y)  is Pareto
2 optimal if it is not dominated. 
 
Definition: Strictly sense solution 
A game have a solution in the strictly sense if:  
1)  There is an equilibrium pairs among Pareto optimal pairs. 
2)  All Pareto optimal equilibrium are interchangeable and have the same payoffs. The 
solution is  the set of Pareto optimal equilibrium pairs. 
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 ﾠNamed after Vilfredo Pareto (1848, 1923), Italian mathematician and economist  
( Enciclopedia Treccani). 	
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2.2   Equilibrium in dominating strategies 
 
After having introduced the notion of dominance, we move toward a first defininition of 
quilibrium by using the previous example. Suppose HR’s Board of directors decides to 
produce the new smartphone using  minimum production capabilities and you are the CEO 
of Pineapple. Using the matrix or the tree illustrated in the previous pages, we can see that 
the best solution for Pineapple is to produce the maximum possible number of smartphones 
and gain profits for 600 millions, which are far more appetizing than the 100 millions of the 
other choice. In the same way, if Hr chooses to conquer the market using all the available 
productive potential, Pineapple’s CEO will prefer to compete directly by maximizing the 
production since his payoff will be of 400 millions, which is better than the other payoff. 
The same line of reasoning can be follow by HR’s CEO when deciding the strategy his 
company should follow. From the graphs above it is clear that the best option for HR is to 
produce the higher number possible of goods in order to recieve the highest payoff without 
depending on Pineapple’s decisions. Therefore a strategy that works well at least as any 
other and doesn’t depend on other players decision is defined dominant. There is no reason 
a  player  should  play  a  non-dominant  strategy  if  he  has  got  a  dominant  strategy.  As  a 
consequence  of  this  attitude  every  player  during  the  game  will  choose  his  favourite 
dominating strategy. Hence we can conclude that when each player can play a dominating 
strategy, we have the only reasonable equilibrium solution when every player follow his 
own dominating strategy. The set of dominating strategies and the payoffs of the resulting 
game are the foudamentals of the equilibrium in dominating strategies.  
 
2.2.1   The Nash and reliability conditions 
 
Choosing the dominating strategy is not the only necessary condition to reach equilibrium. 
In fact there are other two foundamental conditions we have never mentioned before but 
that must be introduced, the Nash condition
3 and the reliability condition. 
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 ﾠJohn Forbes Nash, Jr ( born June 13, 1928), Nobel Laureate 1994. He discussed the 
propreties of the equilibrium which later will take his name in 1950 during his Phd 
dissertation under the doctoral advice of Albert.W. Tucker in Princeton University, New 
Jersey, United States of America ( A beautiful mind: a biography of John Forbes Nash ,jr. , 
winner of the nobel prize in economics). 	
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The first condition, named after the name of the famous mathematician John Forbes Nash, 
states that none player can change unilaterally his decision during the game, in other words 
every player should have determined an optimum response to the other players decisions. 
Because every dominating strategy is an optimum response to every kind of strategy, an 
equilibrium of dominating strategies satisfies for sure the Nash condition. Now it is useful 
to give the formal mathematical definition of this condition. 
 
Definition: Nash equilibrium 
 
Let  (S,  f)  be  a  game  with  n  players,  where  Si  is  the  strategy  set  for  player  i,  S  =  S1 
×S2×…×Sn is the set of strategy profiles and f = (f1(x),…..,fn(x)) the payoff function for x ∈	
 ﾠ
S. Let xi be a strategy profile for player i and x-I be a strategy profile for every player except 
player  i. When  each  player  i  ∈	
 ﾠ {1,2,3,…..N}  chooses  strategy  xi  resulting  in  strategy 
profile  x =(x1, x2,…..,xn) then player I obtains a payoff f(i). 
The payoff depends on the strategy profile chosen, on the strategy chosen by player i as 
well on the strategies chosen by other players. This strategy x
* ∈	
 ﾠS  profile is a Nash 
equilibrium if no unilateral deviation in strategy by any single player is profitable for that 
player, that is  
 
∀	
 ﾠi, xi ∈	
 ﾠS, xi ≠ xi
* : fi(xi
*
 , x-i) ≥ fi(xi
*, x
*
-i) 
 
In addition when the above inequality holds strictly ( with > instead of ≥ ) for all players 
and all practicable strategies we talk about strict Nash equilibrium. If instead, for some 
player, there is an exact equality between xi
* and another strategy in the set S, we call the 
equilibrium a weak Nash equilibrium. 
 
 
The reliability condition, instead, request that during the selection process of an action, the 
player has an effective interest in choosing the action contained in his strategy.  
Reporting these considerations in the previous example, we see that HR’s strategy satisfies 
the reliability condition without any doubts, since this strategy contemplate only one action 
and  the  Nash  condition  is  enough  to  guarantee  that  is  in  HR’s  interest  adopting  the 	
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dominating strategy. We now demonstrate that Pineapple’s strategy too satisfies these two 
conditions even if a little bit more difficult. 
First of all the Pineapple’s strategy to produce a lot of smartphones if HR do the same 
satisfies  the  reliability  condition;  in  reality  this  is  what  the  corporation  does  in  an 
equilibrium condition. The most critical aspect to verify is if the threat of Pineapple to use 
all her production capabilities in case HR produce a low quantity of goods is trustworthy or 
not. But if we look at the game tree we see that it is: in fact if HR chooses the minimum 
production Pineapple would have a payoff of 600 millions producing at the top of her 
capabilities and a payoff of 300 millions in the other case.  
It is not surprising that Pineapple’s strategy is trustworthy since is dominating and so,  
whatever HR decides to do, works at least as well as any other available strategy. 
We finally found out that the equilibrium that we find satisfies both Nash and reliability 
conditions. 
 
2.2.2   Perfect equilibrium 
 
The  previous  game  was  pretty  simple  because  there  was  an  equilibrium  made  of 
dominating strategies but unfortunately this isn’t the most common case.  
Suppose we have the same previous example but with different payoffs like illustrated in 
the tree below. 
In this case there isn’t an equilibrium of dominating strategies. In fact while Pineapple can 
produce a lot if HR decides to produce less and vice versa, which is a dominating strategy, 
HR hasn’t got this possibility. As we can see from the tree, HR has the handicap to have the 
first move and so the Board of directors of this company should foresee the decisions of 
Pineapple’s management. From the considerations made in the preceding paragraphs, it 
would be logically correct to expect that Pineapple will choose its dominating strategy but, 
at  the  same  time,  one  of  the  main  axioms  of  game  theory  states  that  every  player  is 
conscious of other players rationality in the game. As a result of that HR should expect that 
its rival will choose one of its dominating strategy because every other decision would be 
irrational. Before proceeding with our reasoning, it is very useful to introduce a method of 
analysis of the game tree that we will call induction. This method can be described in the 
following steps referred to the game tree: 
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1)  Find the last decision that one of the players must make before the payoffs are 
revealed. 
2)  For every of these decisional nodes, detect the ones that maximizes the payoff of the 
player. 
3)  Develop a strategy assuming that every player chooses the strategy that maximizes 
his payoff for every decisional node. 
4)  Use this strategy in order to direct the actions of the player that must move for first. 
 
It is simple to see that this line of reasoning forces HR to ignore every type of menace or 
agreement with Pineapple. This example will help us to understand that the Nash condition 
only is not sufficient to provide equilibrium. In fact if we search the equilibrium by using 
only the Nash condition we would have two possible conditions: 
•  HR produces the maximum quantity of products, Pineapple produces the minimal 
amount 
•  HR produces the minimal amount, Pineapple produces the maximum quantity. 
 
However the arguments behind the second equilibrium point isn’t that convincing. In fact 
HR would choose the strategy to produce less in order to avoid that Pineapple’s decision 
could  damage  both  corporations  profits.  But  to  be  trustworthy  a  menace  must  give  an 
effective bonus to who can realize it. Let’s use this concept in the formulation of a strategy. 
It is extremely important that, when some player must decide, that it is in his own interest 
to  take  in  that very moment  the  decision  which  suits  best  to  his  equilibrium  strategy. 
Suppose that Pineapple menaced to invade the market if HR’s strategy include a massive 
production of goods but let’s assume also that this menace isn’t considered trustworthy by 
HR director who decides to follow the more aggressive strategy. What reaction should he 
wait from Pineapple’s manager? Unfortunately for Pineapple’s investors the menace didn’t 
worked  in  the  hoped  way,  so  the  manager  they  have  appointed  must  “surrender”  and 
produce less than HR in order to receive more profits. Finally we arrived at the equilibrium 
point where HR’s optimum response to Pineapple’s dominating strategy is producing the 
maximum possible number of smartphones and the dominating strategy of Pineapple is the 
best reply to HR’s strategy. We showed that these strategies satisfy both the Nash and 
reliability  condition  and  we  call  perfect  equilibrium  the  equilibrium  founded  in  the 
previous lines.   	
 ﾠ
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   Figure 2.1: Tree representation of the game with the new payoffs.      
   
Payoffs	


(HR,Pineapple)	


	


Pineapple	


decisions	


	


HR 
decisions	


HR	


Max 
Production	


Max 
Production	

 (100, 100)	


Min 
Production	

 (600, 200)	


Min 
Production	


Max 
production	

 (200, 600)	


Min 
Producion	

 (500, 500)	
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3   Games with imperfect information 
 
3.1   Definition 
 
In the previous paragraphs we analized only games where players make their decisions 
consequentially and every player is perfectly aware about every move of his rivals when he 
must take a decision. Unfortunately the reality of facts isn’t that simple. It is very likely that 
a  player,  at  the  time  he  has  to  make  a  choice,  doesn’t  know  which  strategic  line  his 
opponent decided to follow. That can occur because players decide simoultaneously, so we 
are in the case of a game in strategic form or nonextensive game, or because they simply 
hide their actions. Real life by the way is plenty of examples. Think about the Cold War 
when U.S.A. and U.R.S.S. were in strict comptetition to reach the space for first. Their both 
main concern was to hide to the opponent their technology status although they both was 
very intrested to find out their rival’s scientific achievements. We can find the same line of 
reasoning  when  talking  about  the  competition  between  two  or  more  hi-tech  companies 
which are going to launch a new product in the market. They both would be very pleased if 
their competitors give them a draft with the progress of their technology, their business plan 
and their intentions for the future. But this will remain nothing but a dream and that’s the 
reason there are patents and corporations usually hire a lot of lawyers, to protect their own 
technlogy and informations.  
When  a  player  must  choose  an  action  without  knowing  any  decisions  taken  before  or 
simultaneously by other players we talk about an imperfect information game.  
For these reasons, when a player must make up his mind, he doesnt’ know at which node of 
the game tree he is although we can define the set that contains player’s  actions: it is the 
set of the nodes in which a player could be find because of his opponents’ moves. 
 
 
 
3.2   The prisoner’s dilemma 
 
Here we describe one of the most famous example of a imperfect information game. 
Suppose you and your best friend robbed a bank but, unfortunately, the police collected 
enough proofs to be sure that you both are the culprits and, as a result, closed you in two 	
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separate and remote cells. The chief officer of the police station, who must question you 
about the fact, however, gives you the possibility of being freed immediately if you testify 
against your friend and ,at the same time, his assistant make the same proposal to your 
friend. What you don’t know is this: 
 
•  If you  testify one against the other (confess), you both will recieve 20 years of 
prison. 
•  If you testify but your friend doesn’t, you will be immediately freed and your friend 
will recieve 40 years of prison, 
•  If you don’t testify but your friend isn’t the kind of friend you thought and testifies 
against you, you will recieve 40 years of prison and he will be freed immediately. 
•  If you both decide to be loyal and don’t confess you will recieve 10 years of prison 
each. 
 
Let’s make this situation clearer by drawing the matrix of this game. 
 
 
Your friend          Confess   Doesn’t confess 
You 
 
Confess 
                               - 20 
 
  - 20 
                  - 40 
 
    0 
 
Don’t confess 
                      0 
 
  - 40 
                  - 10 
 
  - 10      
 
Figure 3.1: the prisoner dilemma game. Payoffs shows the respective years of prison for 
each player and are negative because are token away from players’ lives. 
 
Because  no  one  knows  the  decision  of  the  other,  it  is  quite  simple  to  determine  the 
equilibrium  condition.  For  you  and  your  best  friend  one  dominating  strategy  could  be  
confess. We have the only equilibrium solution when you both confess, although it would 
be better if you both don’t confess at all. More generally we will define as prisoner’s 
dilemma every game in which the simultaneous decisions of dominating strategies by all 
players gives an output situation in which every player recieve a worse payoff than the one 	
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recieved  if  he  had  choose  a  different  strategy.  Let’s  return  to  the  example  of  HR  and 
Pineapple to prove it.  
HR   
   Max Production 
    
    Min production  Pineapple 
    
   Max Production 
                        400            
 
400 
                        300            
 
700 
 
   Min production 
                        700            
 
300 
                        700            
 
700 
 
Figure 3.2: the prisoner dilemma game applied to the corporations game. 
 
As we can see from the matrix, HR an Pineapple would recieve the maximum payoff if 
they would sign smultaneously an agreement to enter the market in a more “soft” way. 
Unfortunately this type of collaboration ,in theory, isn’t that realistic and very difficult to 
obtain in real life. In fact the equilibrium point will be reached only if Pineapple and HR 
decide to enter the market in an aggressive way by producing all the smartphones they can. 
But  as  we  saw  before  this  way  of  reasoning  will  in  some  ways  damage  both  the 
corporations’ profits. This problem is very usual in the real world, especially when the 
players are represented by oligopolist
4 corporations. 
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 ﾠIn economic theory we define an oligopoly a market form in which a market of a specific 
good or industry is dominated by a small number of sellers which are called oligopolist. 	
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4   Mixed strategies 
 
4.1   Definition 
 
A game in a strategic form does not always have a Nash equilibrium in which each player 
chooses one of his strategies. There are cases in which players can decide to play a game by 
selecting randomly among the available pure strategies. This kind of behaviour in which a 
player randomizes his own choice is defined mixed strategy game. Nash proved in 1951 
that, if mixed strategy are allowed, any finite strategic-form game has an equilibrium. It is 
quite clear that in this case we can’t no longer consider payoffs in the way we did in 
previous chapters since the total payoff could vary during the game according to the chosen 
strategies and their probabilities. Therefore we will define the average payoff, which is the 
expected payoff that must be considered since the result of the game may be random. 
 
4.2   Practical example  
 
Nothing is more useful in these cases than an example to explain how mixed strategy 
works. In order to mantain a useful link with other paragraphs we will focus this example 
on the technology industry, so suppose that, as players, we have Pineapple and a young 
company that we call YoungCo. 
As said above, YoungCo is a developing and growing firm and hasn’t got any time or 
capitals to make itself a develop software necessary to program the brand new operative 
system for its PCs. This is the reason that forced the managment to purchase a limited use 
licence from Pineapple for its develop software package. But by purchasing this package, 
YoungCo  signed  an  agreement  on  some  very  restrictive  rules  that  could  damage  the 
productivity of its software division, as a result YoungCo has a lot of incentives to violate 
the agreement. Pineapple would like to verify that its client is respecting the agreement, this 
can  be  done  through  some  or  several  inspections  which  are  expensive  although  the 
corporation  can  require  a  large  penalty  payment  in  case  of  noncompliance.  Let’s 
schematize the situation with the game matrix. 
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YoungCo              Comply            Cheat 
Pineapple 
 
Don’t inspect 
                           0 
   0 
                    20 
   - 20 
 
Inspect 
                    0 
  - 5 
                 - 100 
     -15 
 
Figure  4.1:  The  matrix  representation  for  the  game  discussed  above.  Notice  that  for 
Pineapple  inspection  gives  a  negative  payoff  since  it  is  costly.  Numbers  represents 
thousands of dollars. 
 
The previous figure gives a more explicit view of the situation. It is clear that we have four 
possible outcomes: 
 
•  (Don’t inspect, Comply). This is the situation where YoungCo is totally honest and 
Pineapple trusts YoungCo’s loyalty. In this case they both recieve a payoff of 0 
since Pineapple doesn’t spend any money on the inspection and YoungCo doesn’t 
anything illegal. 
 
•  (Inspect,  Comply).  In  this  case  YoungCo  honors  the  agreement  but  Pineapple 
prefers not to trust it and to make an inspection. That’s the reason why Pineapple 
loses 5000 $ while YoungCo loses nothing. 
 
•  (Don’t inspect,Cheat). That’s the situation in which Pineapple is too trustful of 
YoungCo and doesn’t make any inspection even if it should because YoungCo is 
saving  a  lot  of  money  (20000  $)  by  cheating  its  software.  The  more  money 
YoungCo earns, the more money Pineapple loses, so it goes under of 20000$. 	
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•  (Inspect,Cheat). YoungCo tried to fool Pineapple by using its software without the 
appropriate licence but Pineapple made an inspection to prevent it.  
Consequences are tough for YoungCo which now must pay a 100000$ dollars bill 
to Pineapple which, in contrast, can cover the losses caused by the unlicensed use of 
its program although it losses as well. 
  
The game seems pretty difficult but let’s analize it rationally. In all cases Pineapple would 
strongly prefer that YoungCo decides to comply, but unfortunately it is outside its control. 
However if Pineapple always decides to don’t inspect, this would be a dominating strategy 
and this would be part of an unique equilibrium point where YoungCo cheats. It is easy to 
see that this game has no equilibrium in pure strategies.  
In fact if any of the players set on a deterministic choice, the best response of the other 
player would be unique. That is the case, for example, of Pineapple which chooses to don’t 
inspect and YoungCo that, as a consequence, decides to cheat. Remember that the strategies 
in a Nash equilibrium must be best reponses to each other, so in this game this fails to hold 
for any pure strategy combination. 
 
4.3   Mixed equilibrium 
 
How should Pineapple and YoungCo behave in a game like that? One solution is that they 
both prepare for the worst. A strategy whose main target is maximizing the player’s worst 
payoff is called a maximum-minimum strategy
5. A max-min strategy for Pineapple is to 
inspect  and  for  YoungCo  is  to  comply,  however  this  strategy  does  not  give  a  Nash 
equilibrium since YoungCo could switch his strategy and decide to cheat in order to recieve 
an  higher  payoff.  So  what  can  be  a  mixed  strategy?  The  answer  is  pretty  simple.  For 
example a good mixed strategy for Pineapple is to inspect YoungCo only witha a certain 
frequency and probability. Randomizing the inspections is also an approach that reduces 
costs  and  discourage  YoungCo  from  using  the  software  illegaly  since  even  a  low 
probability of being caught can “scare” its management. But how many times Pineapple 
should inspect and with which probability? Let’s answer to this question evaluating the 
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 ﾠIn game theory we define a maximum-minimum strategy a sequence of choices that aim to 
maximizes a player payoff against all possible choices of the opponent. 	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
24	
 ﾠ
24	
 ﾠ
possible payoffs of YoungCo. If, for example, the probability of inspection is very low, say 
3%, YoungCo recieves a payoff of 0 for fulfill the agreement and  a payoff of  0.97*20 + 
0.03*(-100) which gives a 16.4 payoff for cheat, which is bigger than what the company 
could recieve if it doesn’t cheat. So it is useful to see what happens if Pineapple raises the 
inspection  probabilities.  Suppose  that  the  new  probability  is  much  higher,  say  0.3, 
according  to  the  previous  calculation  we  have    0.7*20+0.3*(-100)  whose  result  is  -16, 
which is a negative payoff. In this case it is clear that is far more better for YoungCo to 
comply since the expected payoff isn’t worth the risk. From the previous considerations we 
see that if the probability of being caught is too high or too low, YoungCo has only one 
best  response  and,  as  shown  above,  this  pure  strategy  can  not  be  a  part  of  a  pure 
equilibrium. The only case where YoungCo could randomize between its strategies is if 
both strategies give the same payoff. Logically is never optimal for a player to assing a 
positive and high probability to a strategy that is inferior given the choices of other players. 
Let’s find out the probability that make YoungCo indifferent. By solving a simple equation 
we find out that the value of this probability is around 0,83, in fact with this value we have 
0.83*20+0.83(-100)=0.  With  this  mixed  strategy  of  Pineapple,  YoungCo  is  indifferent 
between its strategies. As a result it can mixed them without losing profits. There is only 
one  case  where,  in  turn,  the  original  mixed  strategy  is  a  best  response  and  that  is  if 
Pineapple  is  indifferent.  According  to  the  payoffs  given  above  this  condition  requires 
YoungCo to comply and cheat with a probability of 0.5. Then the expected payoffs of 
Pineapple  are  then  0.5*0+0.5*(-20)=-10  and  0.5*(-5)+0.5*(-15)=-10  and  Pineapple  is 
indifferent and its mixed strategy is the best response for the strategy of YoungCo. This 
case defines the only Nash equilibrium of the game. Since it uses mixed strategies it is 
called mixed equilibrium. 
 
 
 
Definition: Mixed equilibrium 
In an n-person non-cooperative game, the n-tuple of strategies x
*
1, x
*
2,….., x
*
n, where player 
i plays the mixed strategy x
*
i , is an equilibrium n-tuple if for all other strategies y1, y2, 
….yn: 
ei(x
*
1, x
*
2,.,x
*
i , …..., x
*
n)≥ei(x
*
1, x
*
2,.,yi , …..., x
*
n)        1≤i≤n 
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Theorem: Any finite n-person non-cooperative has at least one equilibrium couple. 
 
4.4   Interpretation of mixed strategy equilibrium 
 
Let’s sum up some conclusions from the previous considerations. As we saw above, mixed 
strategies are in some ways “odd” if compared to other games since payoffs of this kind of 
games can express much more than the mere monetary profits. In fact from the payoff 
recieved by a player we can recognize his attitude in some situations since we can see if he 
is a risk lover or is more judicious and prefers not to gamble against probabilities in order 
to recieve an higher payoff. Furthermore the reward of the game can represent other things 
less tangible like the satisfaction or the delusion of a player consequent to the win or the 
loss.  All  these  parametres  which  are  non-directly  quantifiable  represent  the  so  called 
political features of game theory but this analysis exceeds the purpose of this research. 
Another feature of mixed strategies which deserves some attention is the that tha fact of 
mixing could seem paradoxical when the player is indifferent in equilibrium. Why, for 
example, should YoungCo gamble if it can equally comply or cheat? In fact YoungCo 
could be safer by always complying and, by doing so, recieving a payoff of zero. But the 
fact is that there is no incentive to prefer a strategy over an other, so the player can mix 
without any problems and reach the equilibrium. The last aspect of the mixed equilibrium, 
which is the least clear too, is that the probabilities depend on the payoff of the opponent, 
and not on player’s own. In fact it would be very reasonable to expect that increasing the 
penalty for cheating decreases the probabilty of Pineapple being defrauded in the final 
equilibrium. But it does not, the only thing that changes is the probability of inspection, 
which is gradually decreased until the consumer is indifferent. 	
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5   Market Games 
 
5.1   Edgeworth Market Games 
 
In the previous paragraphs we have analized market conflict situation in a very specific 
way, now it’s the time to generalize what we saw and give a more global view of the 
subject. One of the earliest application of game theory was in mathematical economics to 
describe some rules in trading and commerce. The most direct mathematical model for this 
kind of situations was given by Francis Ysidro Edgeworth
6. In the economic model which 
takes his name, Edgeworth supposed that there were only two commoditites to be traded. 
Since electronic goods didn’t exist in XIXth century, he used apples and bread for his 
example. So let’s identify apples with A and bread with B in order to simplify things. 
Assume there are M apple traders an N bread traders. Assume in the same way that an 
apple  trader  starts  with  ai   apples  and  that  a  bread  trader  strarts  with  bi   bread.  In  the 
following lines we will refer to an apple or a bread trader as, respectively, (ai, 0) i=1, 2, …., 
N and  (0, bi) i=1, 2, …..M . The meaning of the overhanging two-tuples is that, at the 
beginning of the game, the apple trader has ai apples and 0 pieces of bread and vice versa. 
We call the utility  of trader i the amount of apples and bread he or she has, and we write it 
ui(a, b). 
 
 
5.2   [1, 1] Market games 
 
Since there is only one trader for each type of commodity, this is the most simple condition, 
where the A trader strats with (a, 0) apples and the B trader starts with (0, b) pieces of 
bread. Hedgeworth developed a graph that represents the results of the trading between the 
two players which is called, not surprisingly, the Edgeworth box. 
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 ﾠNamed after Francis Ysidro Edgeworth (1845-1926). Edgeworth was an Irish philosopher 
who made significant contributions to economics and statistics during the period between IX 
and X cebtury ( Enciclopedia Treccani). 	
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Figure  5.1:  Example  of  Edgeworth  Box.  In  red  is  drawed  the  indifference  curve  that 
represents the amount of commodities of trader A while the blue one represents the goods 
of trader B.  
 
In the Edgeworth box each point represents a possible outcome of the trade where A has (x, 
y) and B has (a-x, b-y) commodities. From the box we can see also that trader A will only 
consider points to the north-east of the red line where his utility function gives at least u1(a, 
0) which is the utility he gets if he doesn’ t trade. Analogously trader B will only consider 
points to the south-west of the blue line, which is his indifference curve of utility values 
equivalent to u2(0, b). What is the solution of this type of trading? Edgeworth in his work 
suggested  that  the  equilibrium  in  the  trade  could  be  find  in  the  curve  that  joins  the 
intersections of the two indifference curves, which he called the contract curve. It is pretty 
symple to consider this model as a two-person game, and, by doing that, it results that the 
contract curve is in fact part of the set of optimal solutions for the players. 
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5.3   [M, N] Market game 
 
Another Edgeworth market game which is worth to touch on since it is the most common in 
real life is the [M, N] market game. In this game there are M-type traders and N-type 
traders as an M+N person game. To make the description simpler, we will make the same 
assumption of the previous paragraph, and we will consider M traders A and N traders B. In 
the same way we will assume that all the traders have the same utilty function u(x, y) and 
each A-trader starts with a of A an each B-trader starts with b of B. In order to find out the 
charateristic function, let’s focus on a subset U of the M+N players with u1 A-traders and u2 
B-traders. We can see that the best condition U can ensure itself is the highest sum of the 
utilities of its members is obtained when they trade each other. In opposition the worst case 
for U is when the traders don’t belonging to U decide to don’t trade with players inside of 
U, with a sort of protectionististic policy. The characteristic function formulation requires 
some  type  of  side-payment,  in  fact  we  should  not  forget  that  A  and  B  traders  trade 
respectively apples and slices of bread and the best way to standardize the price of a good is 
to “transfer” its value into another divisible commodity like money in order to make a 
succesfull trade. However at the end of the bargaing we will consider only the quantity of 
apples and bread of each player. After these considerations, we are ready to write  
 
v(U)= maxx1,……,x(s1+s2), y1,…..,y(s1+s2)    𝑢(𝑥𝑖,𝑦𝑖)      
     
 
where  
 
𝑥𝑖 = 𝑢1𝑎      
       and    𝑥𝑖 = 𝑢2𝑏      
     
 
This formula gives the charachteristic function for subset U of traders. As we can see it 
depends on the utility fuction, in particular on the maximum of this function which in turn 
is detemined by the number of commodities A and B.  
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5.4   Duopoly and oligopoly 
 
The previous two paragraphs were about a very simple game model which, however, was in 
some ways linked to bartering since the two type of traders swapped goods one another. 
This model can be easy to understand  but does not fit well in a real market and, since the 
various applications game theory has in economic sciences dealt essentialy with the study 
of how firms compete with each other, it is useful to focus on how these general models can 
be  helpful  in  reality.  To  do  this  we  must  first  of  all  give  some  definitions.  A  market 
condition where there are only two firms which are producing very similar product is called 
a duopoly, if there are more than two but still a very restricted number we talk about an 
oligopoly. These firms can decide the price of their products by their own and the amount 
of production, these two factors will determine the demand for the product. As we saw in 
the examples about Pineapple and HR, firms in these cases are considered like players in a 
game where payoffs are the profits they make. Now we can explain how the duo and 
oligopoly  models  fit  in  a  [M,  N]  market  game.  Essentialy  duopoly  and  oligopoly  are 
respectively [2, ∞]  and [M, ∞] market games, where firms are the first type of traders and 
they  want  to  sell  their  products  to  an  infinite  (∞)  population  of  potential  buyers  who 
exchange the product for their money ( this is a mere mathematical assumption to semplify 
the explanation since there isn’t an infinite number of humans in the world). However the 
number of buyers is still high enough to be a good reason to consider their reqirements by 
one utility function u(p1, p2,…..,pm, q1, q2,…..,qm) where pi is the price decided by the i-th 
producing firm and qj is the amount of that good bought by consumers. We make the 
assumption  that  buyers  know  the  prices  and  then  choose  the  quantities  in  order  to 
maximizes their utility function. This consideration gives us the permission to develop an 
equation which connect the demand qi  for i’s firm product with the prices (p1, p2,…..,pm) 
setted by the firms, that gives 
 
    qi= fi(p1, p2,…..,pm) 
 
With this equation we can now try to understand producers’ profits,  
 
ei(p1, p2,…..,pM)= piqi - ci(qi)= pi( fi(p1, p2,…..,pM)) - ci(fi(p1, p2,…..,pM)) 	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
31	
 ﾠ
31	
 ﾠ
 
In this equation appears the production cost function ci for i.  
This equation is a very valid, even though simplicistic, model to describe the price of a 
product  in  a  oligopolistic  or  duopolistic  situation.  It  is  worth  noting  that  oligopoly  is 
between monopoly and perfect competition. In fact in a monopoly theory there is only one 
producer  who  selects  the  price  in  order  to  maximize  his  profit  while  in  a  perfect 
competition situation due to the surplus of producers the demand is unlimited and the price 
will be fixed around a constant value. However these two theories lie outside game theory 
for the reason that there is only an available strategy.  
Since this moment we haven’t talked about any form of equilibrium for the oligopoly and 
duopoly situations, and it’s now the time to give at least a brief explanation of this topic. It 
is in some ways curious that the equilibrium formula for these market conditions have been 
developed  more  time  before  the  actual  study  of  market  games  by  a  famous  French 
mathematician  named  Antoine  Augustin  Cournot.  This  kind  of  equilibrium,  which 
surprisingly took his name, says: 
 
Definition: A Cournot equilibrium is a vector of prices p
c=( p
c
1, p
c
2,….,p
c
M) so that for all 
the firms i=1,….., M holds,  
ei( p
c
1, p
c
2,..,p
c
i.,p
c
M)  =  maxpi ei( p
c
1, p
c
2,..,p
c
i.,p
c
M) 
 
Cournot discovered that, if the others firms prices are fixed, the Cournot equilibrium for i-
th firm set the price which maximises its profits, and this holds for every firm involved in 
the oligopoly. Despite the fact that this definition corrisponds to the idea of an equilibrium 
n-tuple in a n-person game, these games have an infinite number of pure strategies for each 
player which is the price they choose, and as a result we can’t appeal to Nash’s equilibrium. 
However there is an implicit upper bound for the price which is made by customers, in fact 
if the price is too high and it becomes literally out of market noone would buy it, forcing 
the firm to low it. This helps to stabilize not only prices but also the prediction of the 
demand and offer dynamic. 	
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6  Game theory application in business 
 
6.1   Introduction  
 
After  having  discussed  the  foundamentals  of  game  theory  it  is  time  to  use  our  new 
knowledge to solve a possible real life problem. Suppose you had a great idea for a new 
kind of electronic device and you patented it. Since your idea is really brilliant, you have 
been able to raise the necessary capitals from angel investors in order to give birth to your 
own start-up, but the hi-tech market is competitive an mercyless so you have to program 
every single step with accuracy. So you meet with your board of directors in order to decide 
a succesful business plan, and to do this you use game theory. The hi-tech market can be 
considered as an oligpolistic situation, since there are few big and famous firms. But this is 
a different kind of oligopoly since you are free to access the market in every moment if you 
have a competitive idea, the problem is how to do it and this is exactly what you and your 
board  are trying to fix. 
So no more words and lets get down to business.  
 
 
6.2   Access the oligopoly  
 
As said before, the hi-tech market can be seen as an oligopoly which gives the possibility to 
other firms to enter the matket if they are “ skilled” enough. To simplify the situation, 
suppose that the specific field of your firm that from now we will call Start-up is dominated 
by another firm only, Pineapple, which produces a device which is similar and comparable 
to the product of Start-Up. This market condition can induce someone to think this as a 
monopoly  instead  of  an  oligopoly,  but  in  fact  this  situation  has  nothing  to  do  with 
monopoly. A monopolistic firm doesn’t have any type of competitors and doesn’t have 
even the risk that someone else could access to its market, as a result this firm does not take 
any decision based on other players strategies. Start-Up now must decide if it is more 
convenient to enter the field of the market dominated by Pinapple or to try in another field 	
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by targeting another type of customers with its new product. To do this, Start-Up must 
make  some  affordable  predictions  of  the  possible  reactions  of  Pineapple  and  their 
consequences. If Start-Up predicts that the game it is going to play with Pineapple will 
reach a profitable equilibrium, that is an equilibrium where it has a positive payoff, then it 
should face directly the other firm. At the opposite, if the predicted equilibrium gives an 
unsatisfactory payoff, then Start-Up should change its product application in order to enter 
successfully  other  markets.  Recalling  paragraph  4,  if  this  was    a  perfect  competition 
condition it would have been possible to predict accurately Start-Up’s profits, since its 
entrance in the market would not have changed the equilibrium significantly. On the other 
hand Pineapple has all the interest in discouraging every possible competitor, and it can 
reach  this  target  by  “scaring”  all  the  firms  that  express  some  interest  in  its  specific 
production sector. There are lots of possible strategies Pineapple can adopt to do this, from 
illegal acts like industrial espionage to legal actions like buying the rights on all possible 
cuncurrent products or like increasing the production of the good which is menaced by 
other firms. Suppose that Pineapple, after having become acknowleged about Start-Up’s 
intentions decides to make an offer for new patent, what Start-Up should do? A tree graph 
can come in our help. 
 
Figure 6.1: Tree graph representing the game discussed above. As usual we write Start-up 
moves in blue and Pineapple ones in red. Payoff are expressed in millions $. 
 
Since  decisions  are  not  simoultaneous  but  are  taken  in  different  times,  the  tree 
representation suits best for this game. We made the assumption that Start-Up has the first 
Payoffs	
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move because it must decide to sell its patent or to enter the market against Pineapple. 
From the tree we can see what payoffs are expected for both firms, in particular we see that 
if Start-Up decides to stay out of the market, it recieves  a 2 millions dollar payoff since this 
is the price for the rights of production of its patent, otherwise Start-Up enters the market 
and faces Pineapple. Since Pineapple takes its decision after Start-Up, its stategy shows 
how how to reply properly to its possible future competitors, then a strategy for Pineapple 
could be the following: if Start-up decides to enter, then we will start the production at the 
top of our facilities, instead we won’t do this if Strat-Up keeps itself out from the market. In 
this game there are two strategies which satisfies Nash condition: 
 
•  (Don’t enter the market, Max production): In this strategy Start-Up prefers to 
stay out and sell its patent to Pineapple while Pineapple decides to produce at the 
maximum of its capabilities whatever decision Start-up take. 
 
•  (Enter, Min Production): In this strategy Start-Up decides to enter the market 
while  Pineapple  makes  the  following  consideration:  if  Start-Up  enters,  we  will 
produce the minimum we can, instead if Start-Up stays out, we will produce the 
maximum.  
 
Let’s consider the first case. The couple of decisions (Don’t enter the market,  Max 
production) gives a Nash equilibrium. To verify this we must control that each firm 
chooses an optimal response to the stategy adopted by the other. One or both   the two 
firms could increase its own profit if the strategy of the other stays the same? Let’ take 
a  look  to  the  profits.  With  the  first  strategy  Start-up  would  recieve  a  payoff  of  2 
millions while Pineapple would recieve profits for 22 millions. Instead if  Start-Up 
decides to enter the market, its losses would be massive since  Pineapple doesn’t change 
its strategy. In the same way we can see that Pineapple maximize its payoff producing 
the maximum possible number of devices in every case, as a result Pineapple hasn’t got 
any interest in change its strategy and we just proved that this couple of strategies gives 
a Nash equilibrium. 
What can we say about the strategic couple (Enter, Min Production)? In this case Start-
Up decides to enter the market while Pineapple adopts the following strategy:” If Start-
up decides to enter we will produce less, otherwise we will produce all the devices we 	
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can”.  If  Start-up  enters  the  market,  Pineapple  has  no  interest  in  producing  more 
products since its payoff would be only 7 millions against the 9 of the other choiche. In 
the same way if Start-Up accepts the offer of Pineapple and doesn’t enter the market 
Pineapple itself would recieve a payoff of 22 millions by producing all the devices it 
can instead of  the 18 millions given by the other choice. We just proven that this 
couple too forms a Nash equilibrium. Naturally, Pineapple would strongly prefer to 
maintain its momentary “monopoly” while entering the market is the preferred strategy 
of Start-Up. We can predict what will be the effective result of the game by applying 
the relieability condition. In fact let us consider the first equilibrium condition. As we 
repeated before Start-Up decides to sell its patent to Pineapple because its management 
is  scared  about  the  possible  strong  response  of  their  competitor  but  suppose  for  a 
moment  that  Start-Up  decides  to  enter  the  market  despite  Pineapple’s  menaces.  By 
doing  this  Start-Up  forces  Pineapple  to  change  its  strategy  and  produce  less  than 
planned, since it will recieve an higher payoff. As a result of that the menace made by 
Pineapple to take over the market with massive production is not trustworthy and so the 
reliability  condition  can’t  be  satisfied.  Therefore  the  only  couple  of  strategies  that 
satisfies both Nash and Reliability conditions and gives a perfect equilibrium is the 
second.  In  fact  Pineapple’s  strategy  is  fully  trustworthy  because  it  bring  an  higher 
payoff than every other when adopted and the same can be said for Start-Up decisions. 
Finally it is very intresting to see that, in a more general situation, if the “older” firm 
can  sign  a  cooperative  agreement  with  the  new  one  and  fix  the  volumes  of  the 
production, this can harm its profits. In fact the new firm which aspires to enter the 
market will consider the possibility of a collusive treaty with the competitor and the 
advantages it can take when choosing its strategy. In conclusion this kind of behaviour 
will give a strong stimulus for the new firm to enter the market and change the previous 
situation of oligopoly, which is always better desirable for the firm or firms which were 
in the market already. This is the main reason why it is  challenging, but not impossible, 
for a new firm to enter a  market slice dominated by other companies. 
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7   Other applications of game theory 
 
Game theory can be used in a very wide range of applications following, basically, the 
same approach we described in the previous chapters and, since these applications are very 
important, it is useful to describe them briefly.  
 
 
7.1   Biology 
 
In biology, for example, we can study and make previsions about the possible outputs of 
the hunter-prey dynamic between animals, or, as well, game theory can be used to foresee 
the result of a the so called evolution-game, where the dominance of a specie over another 
is considered, as an example think about the competitive game played by Homo Sapiens 
and Homo Neanderthalensis. It is useful to describe a simple example of the hunter-prey 
dynamic in order to see clearly the correlation between the two applications. Suppose for 
example you are a zoologist and you have to make a study on the hunting dynamic of the 
hawk. To simplify things we can consider both the hunter , in this case a hawk, and the 
prey, say a dove, as the two players. It is clear that payoffs are no more profits but we can 
assign a number to a certain event to simulate a “natural payoff”. Suppose we are in a 
situation where a hawk have spotted a dove. Since both the hawk and the dove act by 
instinct, they both can represent two different instincts that can be considered as fixed 
strategies: the hunter instict and the prey instinct. The hunter instinct forces the player taken 
into account to attack the prey without considering the circumstances, while the prey instict 
always forces the player to escape when in danger. In the game matrix we consider the 
opposite strategies too since there can be some circumstances that can change both hunter’s 
and prey’s mind. 
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Dove          Escape 
 
       Keep fliying 
Hawk 
    
Attack  
 
                            3 
 
3 
                            0 
 
10 
 
Stand still 
 
                         10 
 
0 
                            1 
 
1 
 
 
From the matrix above we can analize the dynamic hunter-prey.  
•  ( Escape, Attack) : in this case the hawk decides to hunt the dove and the dove tries 
to escape. The hawk can injury and kill the dove but, at the same time, can be 
injured  because  it  can  misst  he  target  and  hit  the  ground,  while  the  dove    can 
successfully escape or be catched by the hawk. That is the reason why they both 
have the same payoff. 
•  ( Keep flying, Attack) : this is the case where the hawk attacks the dove, but the 
dove can not escape because it doesn’t spotted its hunter. The dove has no chances 
against the hawk, while the hawk can easily kill the dove. 
•  ( Escape, Stand still) : in this situation the dove becomes aware of the danger and 
escapes but the hawk decides to keep flying in order to catch another prey. The 
hawk has no loss and the dove is safe. 
•  ( Keep flying, Stand still) : this is the case where they don’t spot each other. 
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This  pretty  simple  and  trivial  example  gives  us  a  clear  but  incomplete  view  of  the 
biological applications of Game theory. 
 
 
7.2   Social sciences 
 
Another and maybe a more natural extension of the microeconomic application is the field 
concernig social sciences. In this case the microeconomic approach is extended from firms 
to people, nations and their interactions. Think about the competition between two or more 
nations in order to achieve economic and commercial supremacy and the decisions they 
should take. It is not difficult to understand how Game Theory can be helpful and useful in 
the decision making process and can, in some cases, make the difference between good and 
bad  decisions  that  affect    lives  of  many.  Social  sciences  are  tightly  linked  to 
microeconomics, as a result reporting an example would be redundant, since we can simply 
generalize  the  cases  treated  in  previous  chapters  by  replacing  firms  with  nations  or 
populations.  
 
 
7.3   Computer science  
 
Anther  field  in  which  Game  Theory  plays  an  increasingly  important  role  is  computer 
science. Not surprisingly computer scientists understood the enourmous potential of this 
theory in the modelling of algorithms which regulates interactive computations between 
computers and multi agent systems.  But the most common computer science application 
can be seen in everyday life, when we are surfing the internet. In fact the online algorithms 
which manage requests and answers between personal computers and servers are based on 
games between a number k of servers where a great variety of variables and payoffs are 
considered,  such  as  response  time,  distance,  energetic  cost,  speed  and  quality  of  the 
communication. Though computer science shares the foundamentals of game theory with 
the other sciences, there are a lot of differences between its application in this field and in 
others. In order to give a brief example of a game which is often used to mathematically 
model distributed computing, such as k servers interaction, it is useful to describe the so 	
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called Byzantyne agreement problem. Suppose there are n soldiers and that between these n 
soldiers there are up to t possible faulty soldiers ( the t stands for traitor), n and t are 
assumed to be knowledge. Each soldier start with an initial preference toward attack or 
retreat. We want to develop a protocol  where  
 
•  All nonfaulty soldiers reach the same decision. 
•  If all the soldiers are nonfaulty and their initial preferences are the same, then the 
decision is coherent with their initial preference.  
 
It is pretty simple to see how this example can relate to a computer science enviroment, and 
this is a typical problem usually solved by game theory methods. 
 
 
7.4   Philosophy 
 
 
Just to give an idea of how broadly this theory is applied in a lot of sides of the human 
knowledge, it is interesting to mention its use in philosophy, especially in the field related 
to psychology and social interaction. Thanks to Game Theory philosophers have been able 
to study with a mathematic instrument relations between social behaviour, ethic, morality, 
uses and costumes.  
 
 
From  these  last  considerations  it  is  pretty  simple  to  see  that  Game  theory  plays  a 
foundamental  role  in  several  aspects  of  human  knowledge.  Thanks  to  its  development 
scientists,  economists,  philosophers,  biologists,  engineers  and  managers  are  able  to 
approach problems in a very effective way finding brilliant solutions which can change in 
better the lives of many.  
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Abstract 
 
This thesis aims to give an introduction of game theory  with a particular focus 
on microeconomics topics. In detail all foundametals of game theory are given 
in order to make a final analysis on how this mathematical instrument can be 
used to study the best ways for a new Start up to enter the technology market. 
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